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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF THE HIGHLY SKILLED: 
ECONOMICS, ETHICS AND TAXES 
Jagdish N Bhagwati 
The analysis of the consequences of highly skilled migration across countries 
has recently moved into novel economic, legal and social areas of intellectual 
inquiry. 
However, progress in the scientific pursuit of these questions, and their possible 
implications has been handicapped partly by the rigid mental and emotional 
reflexes of some of the economists who actively participated in the early postwar 
debate on the consequences of 'brain drain' and who evidently seem to fear 
that the newly burgeoning interest in the subject somehow breathes life into a 
public policy issue that they had hoped to have successfully buried. However, 
part of the explanation lies also in the fact that the new developments have 
resulted almost entirely as a result of 'advocacy economics' in the form of a 
proposal advanced by the author to tax brain drain in the shape of a supple- 
mentary income tax to be paid by the highly skilled migrants from the poor 
countries on their incomes in the developed countries.1 This proposal has 
economic, ethical, tax-legal, human rights, sociological and political implications 
and has, therefore, proved to be a powerful stimulus in opening up afresh what 
was until recently a rather moribund field of inquiry. But it has also corres- 
pondingly tended to provoke more heat than light. 
The Postwar Debate 
The earliest economic analyses of the international migration of highly skilled 
manpower were almost wholly stimulated by the concerns of policymakers in 
the countries that were experiencing a net emigration of professional personnel 
such as doctors, engineers and academics. The emigration was therefore des- 
cribed typically as 'brain drain': a persuasive phrase that predisposed one to 
see the phenomenon in an unfavourable light. 
The late Harry Johnson, writing first in Minerva in 1956 and often elsewhere 
thereafter, was to lead the 'counter-revolution', noting that brain drain could be 
1 Originally mentioned in an article of mine in Daedalus (1972) on 'United States in the 
Nixon Era: the end of innocence', the idea was developed in other writings at greater length 
and was the subject of an international conference at Bellagio whose deliberations led to the 
two volumes: Taxing the Brain Drain: a proposal (Vol I) edited by J Bhagwati & M 
Partington. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing. 1976; and The Brain Drain and 
Taxation: theory and empirical analysis (Vol II) edited by J Bhagwati. Amsterdam: North- 
Holland Publishing. 1976. 
July 1979 Volume I No. 3 
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beneficial to the countries of emigration and arguing passionately that it 
often was. 
The ensuing debate paralleled the classic division of economists into two 
different philosophical traditions which the author once described as the 
'benign neglect' and the 'malign neglect' schools. The orthodox, professional 
economists typically tended to follow Adam Smith in looking for the non-zero- 
sum-game (i.e. every party to a transaction gains) aspects of an economic 
phenomenon. The resulting 'benign neglect' view of these economists contrasted 
sharply with the concerns of the economists whose 'malign neglect' analysis 
focused instead on the harmful aspects of the same economic phenomena for 
specific groups, and therefore raised more pointedly questions of desirable policy 
intervention on grounds of both efficiency and distributive justice. 
Thus, while the economists led by Johnson tended to emphasise the advantages 
to the skilled migrants themselves and to the countries of origin and destination, 
the economists and policymakers arrayed on the other side emphasised the 
losses to 'those left behind' from such emigration, whether permanent, or of a 
to and fro variety. 
Unfortunately, however, it became fashionable to consider the complacent, 
everyone-gains viewpoint as an 'internationalist' or 'cosmopolitan' position, 
whereas the group of economists more impressed by the possibility of the 
adverse impact of highly skilled migration on countries of origin came to be 
described as 'nationalist'. The very same economists who had brilliantly de- 
bunked the phrase 'brain drain' by noting that one had to draw a distinction 
between the brain drain phenomenon and the brain drain problem and that 
migration of the highly skilled could be beneficial to those left behind, were now 
to be guilty of describing their own position in self-congratulatory terms that 
equally prejudiced the ethical demerits of their opponents' position. 
As it happens, there is nothing ethically reprehensible in worrying about 
specific groups within a social entity. Indeed, Rawls' maximin principle requires 
us to put a decisive weight on the impact of a policy change on the welfare of the 
least privileged, so that if highly skilled migration does affect those left behind 
adversely, and the incidence of such losses is on the underprivileged, the princi- 
ples of Rawlsian distributive justice would indeed make it morally obtuse not to 
worry about the migration. Indeed, on more traditional utilitarian ethics as well, 
if the migrants are earning more than those left behind, one could argue that the 
migration, if it imposes losses on those left behind, will be an ethically undesirable 
phenomenon. 
Evidently, therefore, the moral basis of those concerned with the impact of 
emigration of highly skilled manpower, especially from poor countries of origin, 
was more than defensible. And the description of these intellectuals as 'national- 
ists' was somewhat propagandistic. 
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Who Loses? 
When we have abandoned the fetching but foolish term 'brain drain' and the 
'internationalist' and 'nationalist' positions, we are left with the enhanced aware- 
ness that migration need not worsen the welfare, however defined, of the non- 
migrating population in the countries of origin. 
However, the arguments on this question have remained primarily qualitative, 
as always. For, even when economists are agreed on the criteria by which they 
judge policies as desirable or otherwise, they can and will often disagree because 
several relevant variables will be quantifiable only with a generous input of 
imagination and goodwill, qualities that vary from individual to individual. 
Thus, does the permanent emigration of a talented professor from India to the 
US hurt Indian education? The optimist will argue that his research output will 
be available to other Indians, that his research will be of significantly higher 
quality in better conditions and thus will inspire other Indians at home to better 
work; and that his knowledge will also be available on frequent summer visits 
to Indian institutions, to take only some of the more obvious and persuasive 
arguments in favour of the Johnsonesque position. On the other hand, the 
pessimists can equally well argue that his research output may be constrained by 
patents or by CIA secrecy requirements; that his research may then turn to 
fields where India derives no real economic advantage; that his success in research 
abroad may serve only to reinforce the feeling that it is not possible to work at 
home; and that success requires emigration abroad, and that the summer visits 
will often serve to create resentments among those not so fortunate as to leave 
and succeed abroad. 
Several such questions do not lend themselves to easy quantification. The 
field is thus left open to the immediacy of one's own experience in these matters. 
It has, therefore, been customary for the pessimists to come from the poor 
countries where institution building and retention of professional manpower in 
several fields are important problems in the face of superior working conditions 
and enormously improved incomes abroad; and for the optimists to come from 
countries where this is not so because the countries of emigration and immigra- 
tion are much closer to each other in working conditions and salary levels. 
But while economists are divided, in the main, on what the empirical reality is, 
the optimist economists and the pessimist policymakers are divided rather on 
their assessment of the costs and benefits of the empirical reality. Typically, the 
policymakers have leaned to the pessimist view because they are concerned 
with shorter time horizons than the economists who write academically about 
the issues at hand. Thus, for example, economists will say that the emigrating 
scientist will probably return some years later, better informed and more 
experienced, and will be of greater value to the country than when he left it. 
After all, the Chinese nuclear capability was built by Chinese scientists who had 
returned to the mainland from American universities where they had earlier 
settled for long periods. This argument, however, makes little sense to politicians 
and planners who have to struggle with the problem of adapting their economy 
This content downloaded  on Thu, 31 Jan 2013 15:13:32 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
20 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 
to the immediately disruptive exodus of highly skilled manpower. In economic 
jargon, therefore, the difference in assessment of the policymakers and the 
economists is to be attributed to a great extent to different time horizons over 
which they make their welfare judgment concerning the emigration of highly 
skilled manpower. 
These differences are further compounded by the tendency of most econo- 
mists to underplay the importance of the 'non-economic' objectives that people 
often have. Welfare is not simply a function of the availability of goods and 
services. If migration of the highly skilled raises the incomes of the unskilled left 
behind, the economist will rejoice, but politicians will probably regret the 
technological backwardness of the society that follows. 
Recent Analytical Arguments 
It is therefore easier now for the objective intellectual to see that categorical 
assertions affirming or denying the presence of a brain drain problem are without 
merit. Recent analytical developments have further suggested that the 'benign 
neglect' view, which had many adherents among economists, may have been 
oversold. 
Thus, a principal argument advanced by the proponents of this view was that 
the migration of the highly skilled was a reflection of domestic unemployment; 
that it was a 'spillover', or 'safety valve', or 'vent-for-surplus' phenomenon. 
Thus, if a doctor was driving a taxicab in Manila, and was, therefore, virtually 
unemployed, how could his migration to New York hurt the Philippines? 
Persuasive as this argument is, it reflects an implicit economic model which is 
quite unrealistic. Why not think instead of the Filipino doctor as driving a 
taxicab precisely because he is waiting to pass his US examination for foreign 
medical graduates and that if this opportunity were not available, he would have 
to start practice in the outskirts of Manila or even further away if Manila is 
getting overcrowded with doctors. In short, the external migration possibility, 
the brain drain opportunity, actually inhibits the 'internal diffusion' process 
which carries, however slowly, these professional skills to where they will create 
greater social impact.2 
Let us also examine the alternative model where the migration at high salaries 
abroad of one hundred nurses in the Philippines, in an initial situation of a 
hundred currently unemployed nurses, leads to a greatly enhanced expectation 
reward for becoming a nurse and hence to the private expansion of training 
facilities so that annually one thousand rather than one hundred nurses are 
turned out. Since, given immigration restrictions, no more than one hundred 
nurses can go abroad annually, the Philippines is going to be faced with the 
problem of contending with nine hundred unemployed nurses annually, at least 
2K Hamada & J Bhagwati, 'Domestic Distortions, Imperfect Information and the Brain Drain', 
in Bhagwati (ed), 1976, op cit. 
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for some time.3 This is not a fanciful example. It reflects empirical reality better 
than the one where the one hundred nurses, initially unemployed, leave for 
gainful foreign employment and the Philippines can rejoice at the outcome. 
Again, if one presses this 'explosive expectations' argument home, it is easy 
to see that one does not need 'large' outflows to get the resulting expansion of 
unemployment and associated economic waste and political disruption. The 
mere integration of a professional market across countries, in the sense of 
expectations about earnings taking into account the probability of finding jobs 
in every national market, is enough to make the 'explosive expectations' effect 
possible. Moreover, if such integration also leads to an upward pressure in 
domestic salaries of such professionals in the poor countries, this will only 
accentuate the problem. In either case, the oft cited statistics about the 'smallness' 
of outflows of specific professionals in relation to total annual output or stock 
are really beside the point and do not invalidate the argument. 
Moreover, these analytical developments indicate that the 'vent-for-surplus 
spillover' argument reaches optimistic results by incorrectly assuming that the 
unemployment is due to domestic reasons and emigration is exogenously super- 
imposed on this situation with evident relief. Actually, it makes more sense to 
consider migration, actual and potential, as an integral part of the economic 
system and as itself being responsible for the unemployment phenomenon. 
These and related new developments have left us with a keener awareness that 
losses to countries of origin cannot be ruled out and that, contrary to occasional 
assertions about the insanity or non-educability of policymakers in the poor 
countries that sometimes raise their voices in pleas for redress, there can be real 
problems here. 
At the same time, it should be equally evident now that these problems will not 
generally apply to all professional categories in any one country of origin or to 
all countries in any one profession. There is considerable diversity of national 
objectives, the time horizon over which these objectives are sought, and the 
conditions in different professions concerning wage formation and employment. 
This makes it naive to make categorical assertions about the presence or absence 
of losses to countries of emigration. 
Shift of Focus 
While recent developments in economic analysis have served to lend more 
respectability to the contention that migration of the highly skilled can impose 
difficulties or losses on the countries of origin, other developments have served 
to undercut the relevance of this issue and to focus on quite different aspects of 
the m igration process. These developments have arisen in the form of a system- 
atic examination of the tax arrangements that govern highly skilled migrants. 
The primary stimulus for analytical developments in this direction was 
provided by my proposal to levy a supplementary tax on professional migrants 
3J Bhagwati & K Hamada, 'The Brain Drain, International Integration of Markets for 
Professionals and Unemployment', in Bhagwati (ed), 1976, op cit. 
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from developing countries, to be levied and assessed on their incomes in the 
developed countries of immigration. The specific ethical rationale at the time 
involved the view that highly skilled migrants coming from poor countries 
ought to make an institutionalised tax contribution from their earnings to their 
countries of origin, and possibly for development financing to poor countries 
en bloc. It is somewhat hypocritical for developing countries to ask rich countries 
to tax their citizens in order to finance foreign development aid, while not under- 
taking any direct tax burden themselves. 
A great deal of economic, legal and sociological thinking on the questions that 
this proposal stimulated, indeed often provoked, as also deliberations on it at 
international conferences and an intergovernmental expert group meeting in 
March 1978, suggests that the surest way to defuse emotional reactions and 
prevent them from overtaking one's ability to look dispassionately at these new 
ideas is to note that international migration of the highly skilled, often varying 
in duration and constituting a to and fro movement across countries, is an 
important aspect of the interdependence that characterises the modern world. 
It is, therefore, necessary to examine the equity and efficiency aspects of the 
existing and potential arrangements for taxing highly skilled migrants, much as 
it has been done by economists, political scientists and tax lawyers for multi- 
national corporations and international capital movements. 
It also helps to distinguish between two quite different ideas, namely taxation 
of the migrants themselves, and tax sharing by the countries of immigration with 
the countries of origin. The rationales for these alternative proposals, as also 
their legal, administrative, economic and political implications, are naturally 
different. 
Taxing Migrants 
The case for taxing highly skilled migrants on their incomes in the countries of 
immigration can be developed on alternative rationales. Two major ideas in the 
literature may be briefly noted here before I move on to a more sustained state- 
ment of a third, more compelling, rationale. 
An obvious rationale lies in the fact that these migrants typically make 
substantial earnings when they manage to emigrate (except probably when they 
are expelled as in Uganda, in which case the decision to migrate is involuntary), 
whereas there is the distinct possibility that their emigration causes losses to the 
countries of emigration. It would then be appropriate to ask that some taxation 
should be levied on those who are allowed to migrate in pursuit of a humanistic 
world order for the compensatory benefit of those who are unwilling, or more 
often unable, to migrate. 
A very different rationale, but one that is built partly on the identical premise 
that the migrants derive major gains in income, follows from the oldest argument 
for taxation in economic science: the taxation of economic rents. The stiff 
immigration restrictions in the rich countries, and the enormous differentials in 
economic rewards between rich and poor countries, imply that the professionals 
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migrating from the poor countries into rich ones enjoy windfall gains in the 
nature of economic rent. These rents, like all economic rents (for example, the 
monopoly profits enjoyed by those who manage to get the scarce import 
licences in exchange-,control regimes that confer scarcity premia on imports), 
can be taxed to social advantage without entailing any harmful effects through 
distortion of resource allocational incentives.4 Thus, migrants from the poor 
countries or the South may be taxed to raise resources for development spending 
in the poor countries, much as profits from the sale of IMF gold stocks at the 
substantially higher market prices are being used currently to assist needier 
member countries. 
Both the rationales above are likely to apply with much greater force to the 
migration of the highly skilled from the South to the North than to the intra- 
North mobility of such people.5 The windfall gains are much higher for South- 
North migration; and the disruption and losses are more likely to arise for 
countries of emigration in the South. 
The most compelling rationale, however, emerges if we reflect on the nature 
of modern migration of the highly skilled. We are, in a sense, back to the 
nomadic culture. We are born in one country, get educated there and elsewhere, 
work over a lifetime in several countries and may retire perhaps in a country 
different from the one we were born in. However, the most characteristic 
tendency of the modern, highly skilled migrants in this complex world is that 
they typically tend to retain their nationality as also their ethnic ties. The world 
has collapsed into a manageable geographical unit, with cheap transportation, 
conferences and foundation financed short term visits for virtually all those who 
fall in the highly skilled categories. Few change nationalities any longer, even 
when they have changed residence permanently. The professional and especially 
the academic world is truly international and the pressures of assimilation that 
led to the 'melting pot', and the need to affirm loyalty to one's host nation by 
changing nationality, are no longer operative in anything like the same degree. 
The result is that the professional migrants retain their national status and 
associated rights, including often the right to vote, but carry no corresponding 
tax obligation, even of a minimal nature. The situation is one of 'representation 
without taxation'. The anomaly is particularly compounded because typically 
these highly skilled migrants are among the more prosperous and successful 
even prior to their migration, and their ability to work abroad additionally 
renders them the most taxable, but almost totally untaxed, citizens of their 
countries. When one considers that in Albert Hirschman's apt conceptualisation 
4While these rents will generally imply that there are no resource allocational effects from 
their presence or their being taxed away, recent analysis of 'rent seeking' models has shown 
that rents, in fact, lead to the wastage of resources because they inevitably lead to 'rent 
seeking' activities: e.g. firms using people to obtain larger shares of the import licences. 
Thus, again, a great wastage of resources may be caused in the countries of emigration from 
'rent seeking' activities directed at getting the scarce entry permits to jump over the restrictive 
barriers imposed by inmmigration authorities. This qualification, however, means that a tax 
that reduces the net rents accruing to the migrants will only reduce this 'rent seeking' loss of 
the less developed countries. 
'The reference here is to first country of origin i.e. an Indian doctor coming to the US from 
England is still considered a South-North movement. 
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these migrants have not chosen to 'exit' but have retained 'voice' and 'loyalty', 
it appears legitimate to regard their escaping the tax system as altogether 
incongruous.6 
Curious Anomaly 
Curiously, this anomaly of 'representation without taxation' at the emigration 
end has been matched by the anomaly of 'taxation without representation' at 
the immigration end. The immigrants have been typically excluded from all 
voting rights, even in the US which has often been the champion of civil rights 
and whose Supreme Court has progressively struck down discrimination against 
resident aliens. However, there have been exceptions to this practice. For 
example, in the state of Victoria in Australia, aliens owning property within the 
municipality have been allowed local voting rights; in New Zealand, aliens 
"ordinarily resident' for at least a year have the vote even in the general election; 
and in Ireland all foreigners have the right to vote and even to be elected in 
local elections.7 The question has further been vigorously debated in recent 
years in West Germany, France, Switzerland and Luxembourg, whereas Sweden 
actually allowed non-Swedes to vote in the elections of September 1976 for the 
first time.8 
By contrast, the symmetric move towards elimination of 'representation 
without taxation' has surfaced only recently to the level of intellectual and policy 
discussions. Such reform, which would bring the highly skilled (and others) 
working abroad into the tax net, is in fact precisely what is done under the 
existing 'global tax' system, under which all nationals working and living abroad 
are taxable, as opposed to the 'schedular tax' system where they are taxed on 
the basis of residence rather than nationality. Countries such as the US, Mexico 
and the Philippines practise the global tax system to their advantage, and the 
poor countries, which generally do not, have forgone their right to tax nationals 
abroad, when they can least afford it. 
Such a global tax system is fully acceptable under existing international tax 
law, is consistent with human rights conventions at the UN and elsewhere - no 
one has accused the US yet of violating human rights because of its tax laws - 
and reflects notions of equity that characterise nearly all western societies 
6The relevance of Hirschman's concepts to the problems discussed in this paper was suggested 
by Kindleberger's review article in Mfiierva (1978) of the two volumes by myself, 
op cit, and H Grubel and A Scott's The Brain Drain: determinants, measurenment and welfare 
effects, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press. 1977. However, whereas Kindleberger uses 
Hirschman, to argue against the taxation of migrants, on the false assumption that they have 
'exited' in the Hirschman sense, I use it to argue the exact opposite, on the assumption that 
they have not, but in fact retain 'loyalty' and 'voice'. 
7Sica, 'Involvement of the Migrant Worker in Local Political Life in the Host Country', 
International Migration, 15 (2/3) 1977. 
8Hammar, 'The First Immigrant Election,' International Migration, 15(2/3), 1977. The election, 
although described as the 'general election' by Hammar, appears to have been only to local 
bodies. Interestingly, the Swedish authorities not merely offered the vote to foreign 
workers, but in fact spent a great deal of time and money to educate them about the 
Swedish political system. 
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today.9 Moreover, it fits in very nicely with the emerging stress in intellectual 
circles in less developed countries that increased 'self reliance' is necessary. 
There is also the increased perception that the bargaining power of the less 
developed countries is not as great as was believed in the early euphoric days of 
the success of the OPEC cartel. For what could be better for developing countries 
than taxing their prosperous nationals working and living abroad in order to 
raise resources, especially when the developed countries are not really critical of 
this effort, as the tax can be levied and collected unilaterally without bringing 
them into the picture in any essential way?10 This is not to deny, of course, 
that in several cases the collection would be more efficient if, under bilateral or 
multilateral tax treaties, the developed countries were to agree to supplying 
minimal tax information on foreign nationals residing in their territories.11 
Harmonising Transition 
While, furthermore, the global tax system can be adopted unilaterally by single 
countries, an advantage of several countries exercising such an option, more or 
less simultaneously, would be that they could then harmonise tax rates on 
nationals abroad, thereby making the transition to the global tax system appear 
legitimate, fair and hence defensible against special interest lobbying. At the 
same time, such simultaneous action would make it easier to seek tax treaties 
that would make the collection easier. 
It is interesting to note therefore that in the concerted position of the Group 
of 77 reached at the UNCTAD Inter-Governmental Group of Experts meeting 
on highly skilled migration in early 1978, the possible adoption of the global tax 
system by less developed countries was incorporated in the draft recommenda- 
tions and, by implication, in the agreed Report, signed, among others, by the 
developed countries.12 
While, therefore, my original proposal to tax brain drain visualised a format 
where developing countries would levy the supplementary income tax with the 
developed countries of immigration agreeing to its collection and enforcement 
'From the viewpoint of efficiency also, recent work on the theory of public finance underlines 
how the escape of one set of taxpayers from the tax net, just because they live and work 
abroad, is harmful to the country of origin. See recent work of Bhagwati, Hamada and John 
Wilson's thesis at MIT, 1979. 
"Both the US and the Philippines collect their taxes on nationals abroad without the aid of 
the countries where their nationals reside and work. In the case of the Philippines, the collec- 
tion is reportedly geared to passport renewal and the associated requirement that the docu- 
mentation to be produced for such renewal must include a copy of the tax information -that 
is issued by the tax authorities of the country of residence. 
"Bilateral renewable tax treaties may be the only way to proceed realistically. It is difficult, 
for example, to think of the Swedish government agreeing to a multilateral treaty which 
requires it to yield information on Chilean and Ugandan nationals in Sweden to their govern- 
ments. 
"The UNCTAD Expert Group met from 27 February to 7 March, 1978. The Group of 77 in 
its Draft Recommendations, urged the developed countries to 'render assistance, either on a 
bilateral or multilateral basis, to developing countries which exercise or wish to exercise their 
internationally recognised jurisdiction to tax their citizens abroad under a "global" tax 
system; such assistance could take the form either of "tax collection assistance" and/or of 
access to information.'[TD/B/C6/AC4/LI/Rev 1, 1978, Committee on Transfer of Technology, 
p 3, Section A(2Xd).] 
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under a UN treaty, and the revenues to be disbursed for development spending 
via some UN agency, the optimal format now seems to be essentially for the 
developing countries to exercise their global tax jurisdiction abroad and not to 
involve the developed countries of immigration into the process except through 
seeking bilateral or multilateral, mutually acceptable, treaties aimed merely at 
'normal' exchange of tax information. In this version, the proposal to tax the 
brain drain turns into an action of 'self reliance' by the developing countries, 
rather than appearing as something that the developed countries would do for the 
developing countries. The onus thus shifts to the developing countries as far as 
policy action is concerned. 
The extension of the global tax system to nationals working abroad can be 
undertaken without, in most cases, involving 'double taxation'. The principle 
of double taxation, of course, is by no means sacrosanct and its economic basis 
is derived from the assumption of perfect international mobility of factors, a 
postulate which is certainly invalid because of severe immigration restrictions. 
Nonetheless, if this principle were still considered desirable, it would create few 
difficulties, since tax rates in developing countries applicable to incomes in the 
developed countries would generally exceed corresponding tax rates in the 
developed countries, largely because the unadjusted incomes abroad would take 
these nationals into very high tax income brackets at home.13 If therefore 
developing country tax schedules were to be applied to incomes earned by 
nationals living abroad, it would be natural to make adjustments for the higher 
cost of living abroad, much as the US does with Section 911 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. An alternative, simpler procedure would be to follow the 
Philippines example, and to levy a flat rate of 1 to 3 per cent on the incomes 
of nationals working abroad, regardless of their residence status. The 'small' tax 
rate avoids the incidence of double taxation, while sparing the taxpayer and the 
Filipino authorities the costs of filling out and checking complicated schedules. 
Again, it is true that the adoption of a global tax system would encourage some 
to change their nationality. I doubt, however, if US and Filipino nationals living 
and working abroad have changed nationality in significant numbers because 
of the incidence of domestic taxation. But even if nationalities were to be 
changed, why should that harm the countries of emigration? The revenues 
earned from global taxation would cease for such ex-nationals; but would that 
really matter? 
Also, the fear that such taxation would cut into remittances appears to be 
groundless. Not merely casual empiricism, but also such statistics as are avail- 
able, suggest strongly that remittances go mainly from unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers rather than from the highly skilled. Typically, the highly skilled 
migrants tend to come from successful families and hardly need to support needy 
members left behind. A global tax system which is suitably progressive and taxes 
skilled higher paid workers rather than the unskilled, lower paid workers, should 
not cut into remittances in any significant way. 
"Table 1 in K Hamada, 'Taxing the Brain Drain: a global analysis', in J Bhagwati (ed), 
The New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate. MIT Press. 1977. 
This content downloaded  on Thu, 31 Jan 2013 15:13:32 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF THE HIGHLY SKILLED 27 
Substantial Gains 
As for the tax revenues raised, there is little reason to feel that the adoption of 
the global tax system would not be worthwhile. The Philippines' experience 
with its extremely small tax rate (1 per cent in the main) and its revenue collec- 
tion of roughly Filipino $23 million in total during the four year period 1973-614 
suggests a tax base which is by no means negligible, especially since it is in foreign 
exchange. The US has been raising substantial revenues, estimated at $150 
million in 1975, for example, through its taxation of US citizens residing 
abroad. Substantially greater revenues are also suggested by tax revenue 
estimates that I made on the basis of a higher tax rate of 10 per cent on net-of- 
developed-countries-tax earnings of less developed countries' inmigrants 
(belonging to the professional, technical and kindred category, PTK, in US law) 
into developed countries, taking the stock of these over a ten year period. The 
resulting estimate was close to $500 million annually. It seems unlikely, how- 
ever, that a tax rate of 10 per cent on net-of-developed-countries-tax incomes 
could be levied and enforced without the active cooperation of developed 
countries. But if, say, 5 per cent were considered reasonable, it would amount 
to $250 million and 3 per cent to $150 million at 1976 prices. 
While, therefore, the adoption of the global tax system seems on current 
evidence and reasoning to be equitable, efficient, consistent with existing 
international tax-legal and human rights practices and conventions, and 
capable of raising revenues for the less developed countries on a self-reliant 
basis, its adoption should not necessarily be considered probable. Ultimately, the 
politicians and the policymakers in the less developed countries, as indeed 
everywhere, are likely to consider it expedient to avoid taxing their own nationals 
and to concentrate instead on seeking revenues from foreign governments in 
one form or another. 
The major opposition to the idea from the intellectuals of the developed 
countries is likely to come from a philosophical direction. The late Harry 
Johnson, in private conversation, once expressed his distaste for the proposal 
on the ground that it would help extend the arm of the less developed countries' 
governments to people who had essentially left the country, and that this was 
particularly reprehensible since many less developed countries were now 
dictatorships. This viewpoint could be compelling, given the empirical premises, 
if the less developed countries' taxes were enforced by the countries of immigra- 
tion and, besides, applied even after a change of citizenship, if any. The original 
format of my tax proposal did indeed have these features. However, the format 
suggested above, in the shape of the adoption of a global tax system, is entirely 
free from these sources of discord. 
Sharing Tax Revenues 
The idea of taxing the incomes of the migrants themselves must be distinguished 
4G F M Sicat, A Survey of Problems and Policies in the Philippines, Transfer of Technology 
Division, UNCTAD, Geneva, TD/B/C6/AC4/5, 1977, p 19. 
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from the idea of getting the developed countries of immigration to share income 
tax revenues (raised from the migrants through the routine taxation apparatus) 
with the less developed countries of origin. The rationale for such migration- 
related taxation on developed countries can be provided in two alternative wasy: 
either that the developed countries ought to compensate the less developed 
countries for the losses that the brain drain imposes on them, or that the 
developed countries gain from such migration and therefore, regardless of 
whether there is any loss to the less developed countries, they ought to share these 
gains (based on the inflow of less developed country nationals) with the less 
developed countries that need development resources. 
The latter moral argument reflects a Nozick type of ethical criterion: the 
human resources 'belong' to the less developed countries and the division of the 
gains from their working in the developed countries ought therefore rightfully 
to be shared with the former. This form of argument, which is evidently not 
utilitarian in nature, therefore does not fall if it is contended that these human 
resources would have been utilised less profitably or not at all in the less deve- 
loped countries themselves. 
Of these two notions, the former (suggesting compensation for the less 
developed countries) would appear to be the main motivating force behind 
recent pronouncements from spokesmen of the less developed countries calling 
for a brain drain related transfer of resources/revenues by the less developed 
countries. Consider, for instance: 
. . . I would also like to propose the establishment of an International Labour Com- 
pensatory Facility (ILCF). It could be elaborated along the lines of the Trust Fund 
for Compensatory Facilities of the IMF. The proposed Facility would draw its resources 
principally from labour importing countries, but in a spirit of solidarity and goodwill, 
other ILO members may contribute to it. The accumulated resources will be diverted 
to developing labour exporting countries in proportions relative to the estimated cost 
incurred ue to the loss oflabour.15 
The Commission on Development recommends that, in order to compensate for the 
reverse transfer of technology, resulting from such exodus, amounting to several 
billions of dollars for the last decade, special arrangements including the possibility of 
establishing special funds, should be made to provide the necessary resources for 
strengthening the technological capabilities of the developing countries.16 
However, given the controversy that surrounds the question as to the magni- 
tude, if not the existence, of losses to less developed countries in a meaningful 
and measurable sense, it would appear to be pertinent to rest the case for a 
migration-related transfer of funds from developed countries to less developed 
countries so alon the former moral rationale: namely, the gains by developed 
countries from the influx of highly skilled migrants. That such a gain exists is 
generally conceded, national immigration policies on levels and composition 
"5Address by Crown Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan to the 63rd meeting of the ILO, 
Geneva, 10 June 1977. Note the emphasis on 'compensation' and the notion of losses suffered 
by loss of manpower. 
6Report of the Contact Group on Industrialisation and Transfer of Technology, CIEC, 
Paris, 14 May, 1977. 
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having generally been dictated by national interest (except in the case of political 
refugees). 17 
Thus, by bilateral or multilateral tax treaties, individual developed countries 
could agree, for example, to share tax revenues that they earn from the nationals 
of less developed countries on the basis of some formula. Thus, for example, if 
the formula involved the developed countries paying to less developed countries 
10 per cent of adjusted gross domestic incomes (and hence definitely less than 
half of the tax revenues from PTK immigrants from less developed countries), 
it would appear that the less developed countries would earn under such an 
assessment formula more than half a billion US dollars annually. 
There is legal precedent for such tax sharing, of course. Thus, for example, the 
revenues from taxing the French workers in the canton of Geneva are shared with 
the French principalities from which the workers come into Geneva. And again 
the proposal to have the developed countries share their tax revenues with the 
less developed countries of nationality/origin fits in well with the notion that 
the less developed countries are self-reliant. These revenues are, after all, paid 
by their own talented and skilled manpower which constitutes their 'natural 
resources' and this legitimises revenue sharing arrangements which enable the 
less developed countries to share in the taxes generated from the incomes of 
their nationals. 
Other Proposals 
Finally, two other tax and quasi-tax proposals have been recently made and are 
worthy of consideration as supplements to the two major tax ideas developed 
here. 
First, it may be suggested that the US practice of tax exempting contributions 
to approved charities be extended so as to enable a generous and easier inclusion 
of many less developed country charities as eligible for such benefits and that 
this then be extended to other developed countries as well.18 
Secondly, following the recent US practice of taxpayers being allowed to 
earmark part of their taxes to finance presidential elections, one might suggest 
that less developed country immigrants in developed countries be allowed, in 
the same way, to earmark (up to, say 10 per cent) of their taxes for routing to a 
"7The presumption that the developed countries gain from PTK immigration has recently been 
challenged by Dan Usher in the Journal of Political Economy (85) 1977, on the ground that the 
immigrants receive more from their share in public expenditures than they give up by way of 
taxes. However, his calculations are hardly persuasive, being mainly 'quick' estimates, often 
based on dubious procedures. The general presumption in this regard, which is hardly 
disproved by Usher's arithmetic, is that PTK immigrants, belonging generally to the developed 
country groups that are subject to progressive taxation in developed countries are likely to be 
making a net contribution to, rather than a net claim on, the developed countries through the 
tax system; hence the presumption of gain by the developed countries from PTK immigration 
can only be reinforced on this account. 
"This suggestion is contained in the paper by G Oldman & R Pomp in Bhagwati and Partington (ed), 1976 op cit and is also in the Group of 77 Draft Recommendations at the Meeting of 
Experts, UNCTAD, March 1978. Also see Pomp and Oldman, Legal and Administrative 
Aspects of Compensation, Taxation and Related Policy Measures: suggestions for an optimal 
policy mix. UNCTAD Geneva, TD/B/C6/AC4/7, 1977. The eligibility need not be confined 
to less-developed-country-origin taxpayers in developed countries. 
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designated UN agency for development spending.19 
Evidently, therefore, economists, lawyers, policymakers in less developed 
countries and international agencies are beginning to examine the migration of 
highly skilled labour from the fresh perspectives which are called for in the light 
of the nature of modern migration in a highly interdependent world. The result 
is likely to be the development of a whole set of new tax arrangements which, 
consistent with human rights conventions, replace the existing legal structure, 
which is a legacy of the past. 
19J Bhagwati, The Reverse Transfer of Technology (Brain Drain): international resouwrce flow 
accounting, compensation, taxation and related policy proposals, UNCTAD, Geneva, 
TD/B/C6/AC4/2, 1977. 
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